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State Restrictions On Candidate Access to the Ballot In Presidential Elections: Ander-
son v. Celebrezze' — Article II of the United States Constitution gives the states broad
authority to regulate presidential elections. It provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, Equal to the
Whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the
Congress. . . ." 2 Since the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Williams v. Rhod-e.s, 3 the
Court has consistently held that the discretion article II gives to states to establish the rules
governing national elections is limited by the first and fourteenth amendments. 4 These
amendments, in the Court's view, guarantee the right to associate for the advancement of
one's political beliefs and the right to vote for a candidate of one's own political persua-
sion.' The Court has had difficulty, however, in defining the limits that the first and
fourteenth amendments place on article Il's grant of authority to the states to regulate
access to the presidential ballot. The Court's difficulty is apparent in the contradictory
standards of review it has applied to state-imposed presidential ballot access restrictions.
In one line of decisions, the Court subjected ballot access legislation to strict scrutiny by
demanding that states demonstrate that the ballot access limitations at issue were the least
restrictive means of serving vital state concerns.' In another line of rulings, the Court
required merely that the states show that the ballot access restrictions reasonably ad-
vanced legitimate state purposes.'
In the recent decision of Anderson v. Celebrezze," the Supreme Court attempted to
reconcile its contradictory holdings and to clarify the standard of review it will apply to
ballot access restrictions on presidential candidates.' In Anderson, the Court held that an
early filing deadline for independent candidates is unconstitutional."' The Ohio law that
the Supreme Court struck down had required independent candidates to file nominating
petitions with the Ohio Secretary of State seven and one-half months before the presiden-
tial election." Reasoning that the requirement interfered with the first amendment rights
of voters to coalesce around candidates of their choice and to cast their votes effectively,"
the Court held that the early deadline impermissibly burdened independent-minded
voters' rights." In striking down the Ohio statute, the Court indicated that any significant
ballot access limitation by a state must be the least restrictive means available to serve an
important state interest." The Court asserted that the mere existence of an important
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
2
 U.S. CONST. art. II, § I, cl. 2.
3 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (ballot access laws which place significantly unequal burdens on indepen-
dent and third party candidates violated the first amendment rights of voters to associate to advance
their political views and to vote for candidates of their own political persuasion). See infra notes 43-69
and accompanying text.
• See,e.g., Illinois State Rd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184, 186 (1979).
5 Id.
• See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 186-87 (see infra notes 112-15 and accompanying
text); Williams v. Rhodes 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (see infra notes 43-69 and accompanying text).
▪See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 970 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). See
infra notes 117-33 and accompanying text; American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780
(1973) (discussed infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text).
8
 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
9 Id. at 806.
'° Id.
" Id. at 782-83.
12 Id. at 790-91.
" Id. at 806.
14 Id. at 794-95, 806.
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state concern in a presidential election does not justify legislation to protect it." Rather,
the state interest. must he so vital that it requires protection even though the state restricts
the voting rights of a national, and not merely a statewide or local, group of electors. 18
John Anderson, the plaintiff in Anderson, formally announced his candidacy for
President on June 8, 1979.' 7 At that time, he sought the Republican party's nomination.' 8
On April 24, 1980, after competing in nine primaries, Anderson declared he would
campaign as an independent rather than as a Republican candidate." Anderson re-
quested those states in which he was still scheduled to compete in a Republican primary,
including Ohio, to remove his name from the primary ballot." At the same time, he
sought to comply with the requirements for gaining a place on the ballot as an indepen-
dent in each of those states."
On May 16, 1980, Anderson filed the nominating petition required by Ohio law."
The petition was rejected by the Ohio Secretary of State because it was not filed by March
20, 1980, as required by section 3513.25.7 of the Ohio Revised Code." Three days later,
Anderson and voters registered in Ohio brought. suit against. the Secretary of State of
Ohio in the United States District. Court for the Southern District of Ohio challenging the
constitutionality of the early filing deadline for independent candidates." The district
court granted the petitioners' motion for summary judgment and ordered the respon-
dent to place Anderson's name on the general election ballot. 25 Ohio promptly appealed
the decision and unsuccessfully sought. expedited review by the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court." The presidential election was held while the appeal
was pending."
In other litigation, Anderson challenged early deadlines in Maine and Maryland."
The United States Courts of Appeals for the First and Fourth Circuits struck down as
unconstitutional state statutes with early filing deadlines similar to the Ohio require-
ment. 28 The Sixth Circuit, however, upheld the Ohio early filing deadline." To resolve
' 5 Id. at 796.
' 6 Id.
17
 Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 555 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id.
19 Id.
" Id.
2 ' Id.
22 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782.
" Id. at 782-83. The Ohio statute provided in pertinent part:
Each person desiring to become an independent candidate for an office for which
candidates may be nominated at a primary election .. , shall file no later than four p.m.
of the seventy-fifth day before the day of the primary election immediately preceding
the general election at which such candidacy is to be voted for by the voters, a statement
of candidacy and nominating petition as provided in section 3513.261 [3513.26.1] of
the Revised Code....
Onto REV. CODE ANN. § 3513.25.7 (Supp. 1982).
24 Id. at 783.
" Anderson v. Celebrezze, 499 F. Supp. 121, 124 (S.D. Ohio 1980), rev'd, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.
1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
28 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 784.
" Id.
" Id. at 786.
29 See Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980); Anderson v. Quinn, 634 F.2d 616 (1st
Cir. 1980).
3° Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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the conflict among the circuits caused by the Anderson cases the Supreme Court granted
certiorari.'"
The Supreme Court's decision in Anderson is significant because it puts forward the
proposition that a state has for less an interest in a nationwide election than it has in a
statewide or local election." The Anderson . Court viewed state requirements for access to
the presidential ballot as state legislation which had principally an extraterritorial effect. 33
Such legislation, according to the Anderson Court, did more than burden the associational
and voting rights of a single state's citizens, 34 rather it placed a significant state-imposed
restriction on a nationwide election process." The Court indicated that such state legisla-
tion is subject to a more heightened level of constitutional scrutiny than ballot access
restrictions for purely intrastate elections. 31' This new distinction between ballot access
barriers affecting a national election and those affecting a statewide election that the
Anderson Court has drawn raises significant questions that may prove extremely difficult
for the Court to resolve."
This casenote will examine the Anderson decision and its implications. The first
sectioh will examine the ballot access decisions that preceded A nderson ." The casenote will
demonstrate that in these decisions, the Court was inconsistent in the standard of review it.
applied." In addition, the casenote will show that the Court drew no distinction in these
decisions between ballot access conditions which could be applied validly to national
elections and those which could only he applied to state and local elections.'" The second
section of the casenote will examine the Anderson decision, the new standard of review in
presidential elections that the Anderson Court created and the Court's rationale for
applying that standard:" Finally, in the third section of the casenote, it will be suggested
that although the Court's prior decisions on access to the ballot in presidential and other
elections were inconsistent and in need of clarification, that clarification has not been
sufficiently provided by the Anderson decision.'"
I. THE EMERGENCE OF BALLOT ACCESS STANDARDS: WILLIAMS V. RHODES AND ITS PROGENY
Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that. states cannot unnecessarily
restrict access to the ballot, the Court has not clearly dilineated what the limits are to the
state's power to regulate elections. 43 In 1968, in Williams v. Rhodes," the Supreme Court
held unconstitutional for the first time a state law limiting access of independent and third
" 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
" 460 U.S. at 795.
32 Id.
" Id.
" Id.
3e
" See infra notes 287-308 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 44-133 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 74.133 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 136 -40 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 141-210 and accompanying text.
42 See infra notes 237-308 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); Illinois
State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979); American Party of Texas v.
White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134
(1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
44 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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party candidates to the general election ballot." The statute at issue in Williams regulated
ballot access for presidential candidates." Although the holding was therefore limited to
presidential elections, the language of the decision indicated that the Court would apply
the standards it enunciated in its decision to other elections as well. Indeed, subsequent
Court rulings have used Williams as authority for the proposition that a state's ability to
restrict ballot access for any elective public office is limited by the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment." The Ohio law challenged in Williams required new and
small political parties, as well as the two major parties, to hold primary elections for
presidential electors on a statewide basis." This statute mandated an elaborate party
election apparatus to organize the primary" and also required candidates in the primaries
to file nominating petitions signed by "qualified electors."" The law defined a qualified
elector as one who voted for a majority of that party's candidates in the last election or had
never voted in any election before." In examining the state law, the Court determined
that Ohio's numerous and burdensome requirements made it "virtually impossible" for a
new political party, or an old political party with a very small number of members, to be
placed on the presidential ballot." The Court also noted that the Ohio law made no
provision whatsoever for ballot positions for independent candidates."
Reasoning that the authority article II grants to the states to control the selection of
presidential electors may not be exercised in violation of other constitutional provisions, 54
the Court rejected Ohio's contention that the state had absolute power to establish any
barriers it chose to the presidential ballot." One limitation on the states' authority to
control the choice of presidential electors, the Court held, is the equal protection clause."
The Court asserted that the equal protection clause" does not forbid minor differences in
the treatment of candidates. 58 According to the Court, the equal protection clause does,
however, prohibit state laws which impose unequal burdens on candidates, unless justified
by a compelling state interest."
In finding that the Ohio statute violated the equal protection clause, the Court
asserted that Ohio's ballot access law burdened the first amendment rights of voters to
associate and to vote which are shielded from unequal restriction by the states through the
equal protection clause." According to the Williams Court, the conditions on ballot access
that the Ohio law placed on minor party candidates and independents were significantly
Id. at 31. See Note, A New Dimension to Equal Protection and Access to the Ballot: American Party v.
White and Storer v. Brown, 24 AMER. U.L. REV. 1293, 1302-03 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Note, A
New Dimension].
46 393 U.S. 23, 28 (1968).
47 See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 141; Jenness v. Fortson, 403
U.S. at 441.
" Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 28.
4°
 Id. at 25.
50 Id.
Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 26.
" Id. at 29. See text accompanying note 2 for the text of the relevant portion of article II.
" Id. at 28-29.
56 Id.
" U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
" Williams, 393 U.S. at 30.
" Id. at 31,
6° Id. at 34.
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greater than the conditions the law placed on Republican arid Democratic candidates."
The Court ruled that such requirements burdened the first amendment rights of suppor-
ters of minor party and independent candidates and could only be justified by a compel-
ling state interest." Ohio, the Court found, advanced no interest sufficiently important to
justify the requirements."
In holding that state access to ballot laws are subject to strict scrutiny, the Williams
decision reversed a line of Supreme Court decisions holding that state laws on access to
the ballot had only to pass the rational relationship test." Under the rational relationship
test, the Court would not look at the effects of the challenged legislation but only at
whether the state's purpose in passing the law was discriminatory. 0 By subjecting ballot
access legislation to stringent review," the Williams Court required the states to demon-
strate that a law significantly limiting access to the ballot is justified by a compelling state
interest and that the state law is the least burdensome alternative for promoting that
interest." The Williams Court did not, however, specify what kinds of state ballot access
laws would withstand constitutional scrutiny. It merely stated that the equal protection
clause forbids states to provide positions only for Democrats and Republicans while other
candidates "are clamoring for a place on the ballot.' Indeed, in his dissent to the Williams
decision, Chief Justice Warren's principal criticism was that the Court provided no
concrete guidelines to the states specifying which ballot access laws could pass the Court's
scrutiny "o
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Williams have also failed to provide guide-
lines to the states on the limitations of their power to regulate access to the ballot. The
Court has stated that it can not provide a "litmus paper test" to separate valid from invalid
ballot access laws" and has emphasized that decisions in this context must be "very much a
matter of degree.' In general, the decisions are limited to assessing whether the precise
law in question imposes unequal burdens on voters." The Court has carefully avoided
making rulings which could lend themselves to generalization."
The Court's lack of clarity in deciding state access to ballot cases is evident from its
contradictory rulings on the central question of what standard of review to apply in such
6 ' ld. at 32.
" Id. at 31.
6.1
"	 lvlacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 283-84 (1948) (per curiam); Snowden v. Hughes,
321 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1943).
"5 See, e.g., Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7-10 (1943).
" See supra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
67 Williams, 393 U.S. at 32. See also Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 185.
" Williams, 393 U.S. at. 3 I .
" Id. at 69-70 (Warren, GI, dissenting).
70 See, e.g., Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963; Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
71 "Decision in this context, as in others, is very much 'a matter Of degree' . . . very much a matter
of 'consider[ing] the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests which the state claims to be
protecting, and the interests of' those who are disadvantaged by the classification.' "Storer, 415 U.S. at
730 (citations omitted).
72 See Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion). See infra notes
117-33 and accompanying text; Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979). See infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text; American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S.
767 (1974). See infra notes 93-106 and accompanying text; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974). See
infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). See infra notes
81-92 and accompanying text; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971). See infra notes 77-80 and
accompanying text.
73 See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
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cases. In some cases, the Court has indicated that states have substantial discretion in
regulating the election process." In others, the Court has held that a state may restrict
access to the ballot only to protect a vital interest, using the least restrictive means which
will serve that interest." For example, in the two ballot access cases decided immediately
after Williams, the Supreme Court seemed to retreat from its insistence in Williams that
courts must apply a rigorous standard of review to ballot access legislation." In Jenness v.
Fortson, the Court upheld a Georgia statute requiring demonstration of support for
candidates for elective office." The Court reasoned that the legislation furthered the
important state interest of "avoiding confusion of the democratic process. . ."" The
Court, however, did not characterize the interest Georgia sought to protect as "compel-
ling" or "vital" as it normally does when applying strict scrutiny." Furthermore, the Court
did not discuss whether Georgia had used the least restrictive alternative available for
promoting its interest.
The Jenness Court did not specify its standard of scrutiny. It does not appear,
however, that the Court could have used the heightened review that the Williams Court
applied. To be consistent with Williams, the Jenness Court should have ruled that the state
had shown that its demonstration of support requirement was the least restrictive means
available to further an urgent state concern. The decision gives no evidence that Georgia
was required to show that its law advanced an urgent state interest. On the contrary, the
Court's observation that some states had established lower demonstration of support
requirements than Georgia had enacted indicates that the Jenness Court used a standard
which fell short of strict scrutiny,"
Bullock v. Carter" is another Supreme Court decision that appears to be inconsistent
with the Williams decision. In Bullock, the Court struck down a Texas law requiring
payment of a substantial filing fee as an absolute prerequisite to securing a line on the
ballot.82 The Court noted that Texas had a legitimate interest in limiting ballot access to
avoid clogging the election machinery." In holding that the challenged legislation did not
serve that interest,'" the Court rejected the state's argument that a high filing fee limited
the ballot to serious candidates and was therefore a rational means of forwarding the
state's concern." The Court reasoned that no logical connection existed between the
ability of a candidate and his supporters to pay a substantial fee and the seriousness of his
candidacy." In the Court's view, the Texas statute impermissibly restricted voters' first
" See,	 Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 970 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion); American Party
of Texas, 415 U.S. at 780.
" See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 185.
7" Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
77 403 U.S. 431,442 (1971) (in order to have a ballot position, under a Georgia law, nominees of
small political parties and independent candidates were required to have nominating petitions signed
by 5 percent of those eligible to vote in the last election for the office sought).
" Id. at 442.
" Id.
8° Id.
" 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
"2 Id. at 145.
" Id.
84 Id.
"2 Id.
" Id. at 145-46.
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amendment rights to associate and to vote by limiting the range of candidates on the
ballot from which voters might choose by a wholly arbitrary means."
In Bullock, the Court stated that it closely scrutinized the challenged statute." But, in
striking down the statute, the Court did not state that it rejected the measure because it
was not the least burdensome alternative. The Court indicated merely that the provision
failed because it was unreasonable."' The level of review that the Court used in Bullock
seems to be comparable, therefore, to the level of review that the Court used in f enness. In
Jenness, the Court appears to have applied something less than strict scrutiny by ruling
that the challenged statute was valid because it Furthered an important state interest
without finding that the interest advanced was "vital," "urgent," or "compelling" as the
Court normally does to signal that it has strictly scrutinized a statute. 9° Further, theJenness
Court does not seem to have required that the means chosen by the state be the least
restrictive alternative."' Similarly, in Bullock, the Court indicated that the interest that the
state intended to advance by its ballot access law could be merely legitimate and that the
means that the state has used must be reasonable."'
In the companion cases of American Party of Texas v. White" and Storer v. Brawn,' the
Supreme Court seems to have recognized that Williams, feyness, and Bullock were con-
tradictory and attempted to reconcile them by establishing a mixed standard of review."
The Court suggested, in both American Party and Storer, that a state must show that the
legislation in question protects a vital state interest." The Court did not, however,
demand that the state use the least restrictive alternative to protect the interest."
In American Party, the Court upheld a complex Texas statute which provided four
methods for nominating candidates to the general election ballot." Two small parties
challenged the provision of the statute requiring candidates of parties of small size to
qualify for ballot position either through nominating conventions or by securing the
required number of signatures on nominating petitions." In addition, independent
candidates challenged the nominating petition requirement which applied to them.'"
The Court held that the validity of the challenged qualifications depended on whether
they were necessary to advance compelling state interests.°' The Court found that the
legislation was enacted to serve vital state concerns, that is, preserving the integrity of the
ballot process and regulating the number of candidates on the ballot to avoid voter
" Id. at 149.
" Id. at 143-44.
99 Id. at 146-47. See also Note, A New Dimension, supra note 45, at 1307-10 (neitherfenness nor
Bullock used stringent review).
9°
 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
' See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
92 405 U.S. 134, 146-47 (1972).
415 U.S. 767 (1974)
" 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
n "Storer v. Brown and American Party v. White attempted the synthesis.... The standard of
review actually applied ... seems to have been a mix of strict and minimal scrutiny." L. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 782.83 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].
9" American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. at 780; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736.
" 415 U.S. at 780; 415 U.S. at 736.
9' American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. at 772.
" Id. at 776.
19° Id. at 788.
1 ° 1 Id. at 780.
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confusion.'" In addition, the Court found that the state's objectives:could not have been
met by significantly less burdensome measures.'" This finding was, however, a bald,
unsubstantiated assertion by the Court.'" Justice Douglas, in his dissent, maintained that
some of the statute's provisions were unnecessarily limiting, such as the requirements that
independent candidates had merely a thirty day period in which to gather signatures on
their nominating petitions and that voters could sign the petition of only one candidate.'° 5
The majority did not address Justice Douglas' observations.'"
In Storer v. Brown, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a state law requiring
candidates desiring positions on the ballot as independents to disaffiliate themselves from
all parties one year before the election.'" The Court stated that the requirement was
essential to protect California's compelling interest in avoiding intraparty feuding in
election years.'" The Court does not seem to have inquired into the possibility of a less
restrictive alternative. 1 °' Neither Storer nor American Party, therefore, appear to apply the
strict scrutiny test of Williams. In both cases the Court required the presence of a vital state
interest to justify state imposed ballot access legislation."° Neither case seems to have
required the states to demonstrate that the challenged statutes were the least burdensome
means to protect the asserted interest."'
In its next major ballot access decision, Illinois State Board of Election v. Socialist Workers
Party," 2 the Court again seemed to have changed its standard of review. The challenged
Illinois statute contained a provision requiring candidates seeking ballot positions for
office in Chicago to secure more signatures on nominating petitions than candidates for
statewide office."' The Supreme Court held that the Illinois law was unconstitutional
because it was not the least burdensome means to achieve the state's objective of providing
ballot, positions only for candidates who had a reasonable degree of support."' In this
decision, the Court grounded its ruling on the existence of less restrictive alternatives." 5
In American Party and Storer, in contrast, the Court made no inquiry into the possible
existence of less restrictive means of serving the interests asserted by the states."'
In Clements v. Fashing,"' the last major Supreme Court decision on ballot access prior
to/Indy-son, the Court appeared to have abandoned the position it had just taken in Illinois
Board of Elections.' In Clements, the Court upheld a Texas law barring state, federal, and
foreign office holders from campaigning for a seat in the Texas legislature if the terms of
their present offices overlapped the legislative term for which they sought election."' The
152 Id.
10' Id. at 781.
'° Id.
Id. at 797-98 (Douglas, J. dissenting).
106 Id. at 781.
107
 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
'" Id.
"" Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'" See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
"I See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
12 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
"2 Id. at 186.
14 Id. at 186-87.
"5 Id.
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
"7 457 U.S. 957 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
1 " See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
11 ° 457 U.S. 957, 972 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
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Court split evenly on the appropriate level of scrutiny. The plurality asserted that the
equal protection clause generally does not require heightened scrutiny of ballot access
legislation or any other restriction on the right to candidacy. 120 It argued that close
scrutiny is required only when the law discriminates on the basis of wealth or a suspect
classification, or substantially disadvantaged third party and independent candidacies.' 21
Because the Texas law involved neither suspect classifications nor allegedly unequal
burdens on minor party or independent candidates, the plurality claimed that close
scrutiny was not applicable and that the rational relationship test provided the appropri-
ate level of review.'" According to the plurality, because the only complainants were
Texas Justices of the Peace, the sole issues in the case were whet her Texas had a legitimate
interest in prohibiting candidates for the legislature from holding a paid state office
during their campaigns and whether the "resign to run" provision reasonably served that
interest.' 23 The plurality held that Texas' interest in preventing state officeholders from
neglecting their duties while they sought other state positions was valid and that the law
was rationally related to that concern. 124
The dissent in Clements argued that Williams v. Rhodes and its progeny had established
that the Court must apply strict scrutiny to ballot access legislation and to any other
significant restriction on the right to candidacy. 12" Prior decisions such as Storer v. Brown
and Bullock v. Carter, the dissent asserted, did not use strict scrutiny merely when, as the
plurality claimed, challenged ballot access legislation discriminated on the basis of suspect
categories or imposed burdens on new or small political parties or on independent
candidates.'" Rather, the dissent maintained, "strict scrutiny was required in those [ballot
access] cases because of their impact on the First Amendment rights of candidates and
voters."'" According to the dissent, the Texas "resign to run" statute had the same effect
of reducing the field of candidates as did overly restrictive ballot access legislation.'" It
was subject therefore, the dissent maintained, to the same stringent level of review as
ballot access statutes that discriminated against minority voters, candidates or parties."'
The dissent concluded that the Texas law could not survive strict scrutiny' because
Texas could not possibly have a vital interest in demanding that officeholders resign from
federal or foreign offices before running for the Texas legislature.' 3 ' Further, the dissent
maintained that the law was not sufficiently tailored to its goal.' 32 In the dissent's view, the
statute was so overly broad in its application to officeholders outside the state of Texas
that it did not pass the rational relationship test, much less the strict scrutiny that the
Williams line of cases required the Court to apply to any state legislation designed to keep
a significant number of candidates from running for office or from appearing on the
ballot. '33
' 2° Id. at 965-66.
121 Id. at 964 -65.
122 Id. at 966-70.
Ita
 Id. at 966-68.
1 24 Id. at 968-69.
125 Id. at 977 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12e
127 Id.
12N
!213
in Id. at 980-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 978-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 978 -80 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 33
 460 U.S. 780 (1983):
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Anderson v. Celebrezze is the Court's latest attempt to clarify the states' authority to limit
access to the ballot, at least as regards presidential elections.' 34 In Anderson, the Court
attempted to specify what states can and cannot do to regulate ballot access in national
campaigns,'" As prior decisions generally asserted, this decision specifies that states must
have a strong interest and must design a precisely drawn statute to have a valid ballot
access law.'" In contrast to prior decisions, however, the Anderson Court held for the first
time that close review must be applied with particular rigor to statutes limiting ballot
access for presidential candidates because states do not have as strong an interest in
regulating national elections as they do in regulating intrastate elections.' 37 Several years
earlier, in Cousins v. Wigoda , 13 " the Court held that a state's interest in a party's presidential
nominating convention was too slight to allow the state to establish rules for the seating of
delegates.'" The Anderson decision extends the holding in Cousins to presidential elec-
tions.'"
II. ANDERSON V. CELEBREZZE
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Anderson, began the analysis of the case
with a general discussion of the states' power to legislate conditions for ballot positions."'
The Court observed first that its primary concern in assessing the constitutionality of
ballot access laws was examining the impact such laws have on voters because of a
tendency to limit the field from which voters might choose. 1 a 2 The Court pointed out that
ballot position requirements restricted two basic constitutional rights of voters — the right
to associate for the advancement of one's political beliefs and the right to vote for a
candidate of one's own political persuasion. 143 Both rights, the Court stated, "rank among
our most precious freedoms." 144 Recognizing that, as a practical matter, the states must
have substantial authority to regulate elections so that they can impose order on them,'"
the Court stated that the constitutionality of those regulations depended on the interests
the state put forward as justification and the burden those interests imposed on voters'
constitutionally protected liberties. 14 '
The Court explained further that the validity of ballot access legislation could he
measured by the extent to which the statute placed unequal burdens on voters' first
amendment rights.'" This approach, the Court noted, was used in earlier ballot access
'" See infra notes 141 -210 and accompanying text.
'35 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
133 Id. at 794-95.
137 Id. at 795.
138
 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
135 Id. at 478-79, 489-90.
' 40
 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 794-95.
141 Id. at 786. The opinion was joined by Chief' Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion and was joined by Justices White,
Powell and O'Connor.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 787 (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 30-31).
149 id.
145 Id. at 788 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 730).
1413 Id. at 789.
"7 Id. at 786-87 n.7.
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rulings. 14" The Court maintained, however, that the constitutionality of a ballot access
restriction could be gauged simply by ascertaining the degree to which the statute limited
voters' first amendment rights without reference to equal protection requirements.'" The
Court stated that it would follow the latter course in reviewing the Anderson case. 16°
In addressing the impact of early filing deadlines on voters and candidates, the Court
pointed out that state-imposed early deadlines for independent candidates placed sig-
nificant burdens on voters' first amendment rights."' The Court observed that the impact
was particularly strong when, as in the present case, early deadlines were applied to
elections for national office. 162 In national elections, the Court stated, candidates rapidly
rise and fall in popularity and new issues emerge as a result of national and international
developments. 163 These changes, the Court reasoned, affect declared candidates' strate-
gies and create opportunities for new candidates. The Court noted that Ohio's filing
deadline prevented persons wishing to be independent candidates from entering the
presidential contest in the Ohio arena after the middle of March.' 66 At that time, the
Court stressed, developments in the campaigns for major party nominations had hardly
begun.' 26 The Court emphasized that the Republican and Democratic choices of candi-
dates and platforms still lay five months in the future.' 62 Under the Ohio law, the Court
noted, an independent had the significant problem of deciding whether to challenge the
major political parties before he could possibly know what their candidates or platforms
would be. 136 Furthermore, according to the Court, newly emergent independent candi-
dates traditionally served as focal points for voters who become disaffected with the major
party choices. 16" Independents could not play this important role, the Court asserted, if
they could not secure places on the ballot.' 6° The Court reasoned that, as a practical
matter, late-emerging candidates would be barred from running effectively in Ohio
however important their candidacies might prove to voters in other states.''' Moreover,
the Court stated, not only would a deadline as early as Ohio's exclude from the election
process an independent candidate who decided to run after the middle of March, but also
it would burden even those independents who decided to run in time to meet the deadline
because it would hinder their ability to garner the requisite number of signatures on their
nominating petitions.' 62 When the Republican and Democratic primaries are so far in the
future, the Court found, volunteers are difficult to recruit, media coverage is hard to
"8 Id. The Court cited Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173
(1979); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
149 Id.
I s° Id.
15' Id. at 790.
152 Id.
153 Id.
' 54 Id.
'" Id.
158 Id. at 790-91.
157 Id. at 791.
"8 Id.
1 " Id. at 791-92.
' 6'1 Id. at 787, 799 n.26.
"' Id. at 792.
' 62 Id.
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come by, and, therefore, voters are generally unaware of candidates and issues and are
extremely reluctant to support independents.'"
The Court stated that the constitutionality of a state-imposed early deadline must
depend on the urgency of the state interest that the deadline was enacted to protect.' 64
Because Ohio's legislation substantially limited the constitutionally protected liberties of
candidates and voters, the Court continued, the benefits that Ohio claimed it derived
from the law were subject to careful scrutiny.' 5 The Court emphasized that because
Ohio's law was directed at aspirants for the presidency,' 6' the state-imposed restrictions
implicated a "uniquely important national interest" in the election.'" This national inter-
est, according to the Court, far outweighed the state's own interest.' 68 Thus, the Court
analyzed the constitutionality of Ohio's deadline in light of the relatively slight interest
Ohio had in a presidential campaign.' 69 To support this conclusion the Court pointed out
that in Cousins v. Wigodal" it had struck down a state law regulating the selection of
delegates to a presidential nominating convention because the national interest in the
selection of party candidates for national office was greater than the interest of any
individual state.' 71 1I n Anderson, the Court stressed that the national interest in presidential
elections similarly dwarfed the interest of the state.'n The Court reasoned that the
president and vice president are the sole office holders chosen by voters in all states and
that the votes for presidential and vice-presidential candidates cast in each state affect the
votes cast in other states.'" According to the Court, stringent state ballot access require-
ments which exclude a presidential candidate from a state's ballot dilute the value of votes
cast for that candidate beyond that state's borders.'"
Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that Ohio's early deadline burdened the
rights of candidates and voters in states other than Ohio and significantly restricted the
national election process.'" The state of Ohio, the Court pointed out, had identified three
vital interests it sought to serve by its early filing deadline: voter education, equal
treatment for partisan and independent candidates, and political stability.'n To deter-
mine whether the three interests identified by the state of Ohio justified the significant
burdens the Ohio ballot access restrictions imposed on the presidential election process,
the Court next examined each of these interests in detail.'n
In addressing Ohio's interest in voter education, the Court observed that the state
unquestionably had a legitimate interest in insuring the existence of an informed electo-
rate.'n The Court was not persuaded, however, that such an interest justified a March
' 63 Id.
'm Id. at 789.
165
 Id.
'S5 Id. at 794.
167 Id. at 794-95.
1" Id. at 795.
169
	 at 794-95.
' 7° 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
77 ' 460 U.S. 780, 795 (1983).
in Id.
"3 Id.
174 Id.
[75 Id.
175 Id. at 796.
1 " Id. at 795.
1" Id. at 796.
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filing deadline for independent candidates in a presidential election' 79 and rejected Ohio's
assertions that an early filing requirement assured the electorate adequate time to observe
candidates and to inform itself about them." Because the media in modern times could
communicate information about candidates instantaneously, the Court reasoned that the
length of time a candidate was exposed to the state electorate could no longer be a very
significant factor in voter education.'" The Court determined that rapid dissemination of
information on candidates' positions and backgrounds was especially true in a presiden-
tial election due to the intense publicity presidential candidates receive.' Limiting the
number of ballot positions by an early deadline, the Court maintained, reduced the field
of candidates in an election because it deprived some candidates of their incentive to
run." Early deadlines, in the Court's view, quite possibly restricted rather than increased
the flow of information about political aspirants and issues in an election. 1 e" Thus, the
Court was not persuaded that Ohio's early filing requirement advanced the state's interest
in voter education to any significant degree.'
Second, the Court found no merit in Ohio's claim that an early deadline served the
state's interest in treating all candidates alike." According to the Court, although the
deadline applied to all candidates, its effect was not the same for all.' The consequences
of not meeting the deadline were entirely different for Republican and Democratic
primary participants, for example, than for independent candidates.'" Major party
candidates, the Court pointed out, could have their names entered on the Ohio ballot
even if they did not decide, prior to the deadline, to run in Ohio.' 89
 An independent,
however, was denied a position on the Ohio ballot if he did not declare his candidacy
before March 20." Furthermore, the Court reasoned that a national party candidate had
something to gain if he chose to file before the deadline in Ohio. 1 °' Early filing gave such a
candidate the opportunity to run in the Ohio primary and win delegates to his party's
convention.' 92
 The deadline, however, could not benefit the independent because he did
not participate in a structured intraparty contest." A common March deadline was,
therefore, according to the Court, not equal treatment of independent and partisan
candidates." The deadline did not burden party candidates and independents equally."
Lastly, the Court analyzed Ohio's claim that it had a substantial interest in protecting
the two major political parties from damaging "intraparty feuding." 16
 According to the
Court, Ohio claimed that a candidate's decision to abandon his efforts to secure a major
party's nomination shortly before an election and to run instead as an independent, could
179 Id.
1 " Id. at 796-97.
"I Id. at 797.
"2 Id. at 798.
1 " Id. at 787, 788 n.8.
184
 Id. at 798.
1 " Id.
188
 Id. at 799.
1 " 1d.
1 " Id.
"9 Id.
Id.
191
 Id. at $00.
' 92 Id.
'In Id.
194 Id. at 800 -01.
1 " Id. at 801,
199 Id.
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draw an excessive amount of support away from the principal parties,I 97
 thereby threaten-
ing the state's political party structure,'" The Court reasoned that Ohio's assertion
amounted to a desire to protect the Republicans and Democrats from the competition of
former members for volunteers and other campaign resources."
Recognizing that it had determined that preventing intraparty feuding could indeed
be a legitimate state interest in Storer u. Brown,'" the Court distinguished the statute in
that decision from the Ohio statute in question. The statute involved in Storer, the Court
observed, was a statute that governed an intrastate election, whereas the statute chal-
lenged in Anderson affected national elections."' In Storer, the Court stated, it had upheld
a California law which required an independent candidate to disaffiliate himself from all
political parties one year before the election in which he sought state office.'" According
to the Anderson Court, Ohio's early deadline for independents did not serve the same
function as the California law. 203
 The Court maintained that Ohio had a separate measure
designed to discourage independent candidacies by disappointed aspirants for a party's
nomination.'" The Court noted Ohio's deadline applied to all independents regardless of
whether they had sought a party's nomination for the same election.'" The Ohio dead-
line, the Court determined, was not a disaffiliation requirement as was California's law. 206
In addition, the Court stated, Ohio did not have as much interest in regulating a national
election as it would in regulating a state election,'" Consequently, any reduction in
intraparty feuding that the deadline might produce in Ohio was outweighed by its
burdens on a national electorate.'"
After examining each of the state interests, the Court found that the Ohio statute did
not significantly serve those interests.'" To the extent the statute had any positive effect at
all, the Court concluded, it furthered state interests which were minimal, given the
nationwide scope of the election. 210
B. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, took issue with the majority's use of strict
scrutiny as the standard of review for a state imposed ballot access law,'" He argued that
article 11 of the Constitution expressly granted the states plenary power to choose
presidential electors. 212
 According to Justice Rehnquist, the only limits on the state's
197 Id.
190 Id.
Id.
2" "In Storer we recognized the legitimacy of the State's interest in preventing 'splintering
parties and unrestrained factionalism.'" Id. at 803 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 736).
"' Id. at 804.
"a Id. at 803.
202
 Id. at 809.
a04 Id. at 804 n.7.
2" Id. at 805.
208 Id. at 804.
207 Id,
"8
 Id. at 805-06.
2°' Id. at 806.
210 Id.
2" Id. at 806-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent was joined by Justices White, Powell and
O'Connor.
"a Id. at 806 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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power to restrict ballot access concerned rules denying the vote to citizens on arbitrary
and discriminatory grounds and laws making it virtually impossible for third party and
independent candidates to secure places on the ballot. 213 Within these parameters, justice
Rehnquist argued, the Court has allowed the states to enact any legislation "tied to a
particularized legitimate purpose." 2"
The majority, justice Rehnquist maintained, misinterpreted the holdings of previous
ballot access cases like Storer v. Brown.215 These decisions, Rehnquist maintained, "never
required the states to meet some kind of narrowly tailored standard in order to pass
constitutional muster." 216 Justice Rehnquist implied that the federal judiciary was not
empowered to subject a state's interest to stringent examination, as the Anderson majority
did. 217 He also implied that precedent did not require that a state's legislation regarcling
elections use the least restrictive alternative for serving a vital state interest:21 "
Justice Rehnquist maintained that the law challenged in Anderson met all relevant
criteria for the rational relationship test that he argued the Court should apply. 21 ° First,
he stated that Ohio clearly had a legitimate interest in voter education in presidential
elections. 22° Second, unlike the majority, Justice Rehnquist found that. Ohio's early dead-
line significantly furthered this interest."' He asserted that the rapid methods of com-
munication in contemporary life had not obviated the importance of the length of time a
candidate is before the voters in a state. 222
Justice Rehnquist conceded that the majority was correct in pointing out that Ohio's
law made it almost impossible for Anderson to test the waters adequately as a party
hopeful and then secure a line on the ballot as an independent when it was clear he would
lose in a primary. 223 He argued, however, that nothing in prior ballot access decisions on
Id. at 808, 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 812 (Rehnquist, j., dissenting). justice Rehnquist's rationale in Anderson was somewhat
unclear. He apparently saw Anderson as primarily an equal protection case and attempted to make the
same points in his dissent chat he made in his plurality opinion in Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957
(1982). In Clements, Justice Rehnquist argued that under the normal level of equal protection review
a statute's "distinctions need only be drawn in such a manner as to bear some rational relationship to
a legitimate end." Id. at 962-63. In Clements, Justice Rehnquist asserted that the Court had abandoned
the rational relationship test for close scrutiny review in ballot access cases when the challenged laws
involved classifications based on wealth or imposed burdens on new or small parties or independent
candidates. Id, at 964-65. Justice Rehnquist implied that this standard of review was consistent with
the Court's application of equal protection analysis to other statutes. Id. at 962-63. The Court, Justice
Rehnquist claimed, had departed from traditional equal protection principles only when the chal-
lenged statute placed burdens on ".suspect" classifications or "fundamental" rights. Id.
21 ' 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974). See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, j. dissenting).
21" 406 U.S. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Yu Id.
211i
21" Id. at 818 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
22° Id. at 818-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
" 1 Id.
222 Id. According to Justice Rehnquist, Ohio's assertion that an early deadline gave voters as
much time as possible to g ther information about candidates and to examine how well they
withstood the rigors of a campaign was reasonable. In justice Rehnquist's view the Court should have
deferred to the Ohio legislature in this matter. Id.
"' "Quite clearly rather than prohibiting him from seeking the Presidency, the filing deadline
only prevented him from having two shots at it in the same election year." Id. at 811.12 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
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presidential or other elections forbade that kind of limitation on candidates."' Indeed, in
Rehnquist's view, precisely the same kind of law, in an intrastate context, had been upheld
in Storer v. Brown.' The dissent interpreted the holding in Storer to be that reasonable
disaffiliation statutes are within a state's discretion.'" Justice Rehnquist maintained that
the majority did not convincingly distinguish Anderson from Storer,'" arguing that Ohio
did not have a less substantial interest in avoiding party fragmentation in national than in
intrastate elections as the majority claimed."" Thus, based on Storer and other precedent
Justice Rehnquist and the other dissenters would have upheld Ohio's early deadline for
independents."'
The dissent stands in sharp contrast to the view of the Anderson majority. The
dissenting Justices argued that, based on article II of the Constitution and on Supreme
Court precedents, state ballot access laws must normally meet the rational relationship test
rather than the strict scrutiny test."" Strict scrutiny, according to the dissent, is applicable
only if the challenged statute denies the vote to citizens on arbitrary and discriminatory
grounds or severely restricts the ability of independent and third party candidates to
secure ballot positions."' Ohio's early deadline, the dissent maintained, met none of the
criteria necessary to trigger the Court's use of strict scrutiny."' The Anderson majority,
however, found that the Court must apply strict scrutiny to any law significantly limiting
candidate access to the ballot."' Reasoning that states have less of an interest in regulating
ballot access in national elections than in intrastate elections, the majority also ruled that
state laws regulating ballot access for presidential and vice-presidential candidates must
meet a more stringent level of strict scrutiny than laws restricting ballot access for other
offices."' In the majority's view, Ohio did not assert a sufficiently compelling interest to
justify its early filing deadline for independent presidential candidates to meet the
requirements of the heightened strict scrutiny the Court was obliged to apply."' The next
section of the casenote will explore the importance of the Anderson decision and the
questions that the Court's new position on ballot access laws raise.
III. THE ANDERSON DECISION IN PERSPECTIVE
The Anderson decision is significant because it establishes that ballot access legislation
is subject to strict review by the judiciary and because the Court declared that states do not
have as significant an interest in regulating national elections as they have in controlling
stale elections."' This section of the casenote will demonstrate thatAnderson indicates the
presence of a stable majority for the use of heightened review of ballot access legisla-
"' "This is precisely the same behavior that California sought to prevent by the disaffiliation
statute this Court upheld in Storer." Id. at 814 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
225 Id. at 812-14 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 814 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
227 Id.
226
 Id. at 815 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
229 Id. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 818 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 812 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 818 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
213 Id. at 786-87, 806.
284 Id. at 789, 795.
"5 Id. at 806.
23'' Id. at 789, 795.
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tion. 237 Additionally, this section will suggest that Anderson simplifies challenges to ballot
access laws by establishing that suit can be brought solely on the basis of a statute's
limitation of first amendment rights. 238 Equal protection analysis no longer seems to be
necessary. 23° This section will then point out that Anderson was essentially consistent with
the policy goals of most of the Court's earlier ballot access decisions. 2" It is suggested that
the dissent's approach to ballot access analysis was far less consistent with precedent."'
The casenote will argue, however, that the dissent was correct in asserting that the
majority's use of a particularly strict standard of scrutiny for ballot access limitations on
national candidates was a departure from past practice.'" Finally, this casenote will
propose that the distinction Anderson made between national and intrastate elections will
not make it easier for courts to gauge the constitutionality of ballot access laws. 2"M1 Indeed,
it seems to make ballot access analysis even more difficult.
A. The Significance of Anderson
Supreme Court decisions have not been consistent in addressing the states' power to
regulate access to the ballot. 24" Some decisions have subjected ballot access legislation to
strict scrutiny, asserting that states must have a vital state interest to protect and must use
the least burdensome alternative for furthering that interest to have a valid ballot access
law, 2" 3 Other rulings have applied a mixed standard of review, demanding that the state
demonstrate that its statute protects a compelling state interest, but not demanding that
the state use the least restrictive means to promote that interest. 2" One decision held that
ballot access legislation must merely be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose
unless the law discriminates against suspect categories or limits access to the ballot by
independent or third party candidates. 247
TheAnderson decision specified that strict scrutiny was the appropriate level of review
of state imposed ballot access limitations."' By calling for stringent review in ballot access
decisions, the Anderson case seems to settle the debate on the applicable level of scrutiny.'"
Significantly, the Anderson majority was composed of Justice Stevens and the four dissent-
ing justices in Clements v. Fashing, who had argued that significant ballot access legislation
must always receive close scrutiny by the courts. 25° The plurality in Clements had main-
tained that ballot access statutes are subject to strict scrutiny only if the laws discriminate
on the basis of a suspect category or substantially disadvantage independent and third
party candidates. 25 ' Justice Stevens, in Clements, voted with the plurality but rejected both
237 See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 254-60 and accompanying text.
239 Id.
240 See infra notes 261-70 and accompanying text.
241 See infra notes 271-78 and accompanying text.
242 See infra notes 279-86 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 289-308 and accompanying text.
2"4 See supra notes 44-133 and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 185; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 - 33.
3" See, e.g., American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. at 781; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736.
See also L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at 782-83.
247
	
v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 962-65 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
24' 460 U.S. 780, 786-87, 806 (1983).
249 Id.
2" Id. at 781. See also Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 976 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
251 Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 976 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
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the plurality's and dissent's interpretations of the appropriate level of review. 252 In
Anderson, Justice Stevens fully adopted the strict scrutiny views of the Clements dissen-
ters. 2" it would seem that, for the present time at least, the Court has reached a stable
majority on the issue of the level of' scrutiny ballot access laws must receive.
In addition to settling the level of scrutiny to be accorded ballot access legislation, the
Anderson decision has facilitated challenges to ballot access laws by the supporters of
independent and third party candidates?` The Court in Anderson did not rely on equal
protection analysis, 255 even though it recognized that equal protection analysis was used in
its prior decisions. 25" The Anderson Court based its argument solely on the first and
fourteenth amendments, 257 viewing Ohio's March filing deadline for independents only
as a restriction on Anderson's supporters' rights to vote arid to associate. 25" It appears that
the new majority, by specifically ruling that challenges to ballot access restrictions can be
based solely on first amendment rights, has attempted to ease the burden of proof on
voters seeking invalidation of ballot access statutes. Plaintiffs, afterAnderson it seems, need
no longer argue that they were denied equal protection because a state's ballot access
legislation placed greater restrictions on them than on supporters of major party candi-
dates. 259
 As a result of the decision in Anderson, voters bringing suit need only prove that
their voting rights have been unnecessarily restricted by a condition for ballot positions. 260
Anderson not only settled the question of when close scrutiny must apply to ballot
access legislation and provided a new rationale for the use of strict review, but also it is
consistent in several respects with the Court's earlier rulings. First, the Court has required
vigorous scrutiny in a number of other contexts in whi -ch state legislation has limited the
right to vote. The Court has, for example, used strict scrutiny as the test of the constitu-
tionality of laws restricting eligibility to vote in primaries in Kasper v. Pontikes, 261 laws
establishing requirements for voting in Dunn v. Blumstein 2" and Carrington v. Ra,sh,"' and
laws restricting ballot access to interested voters in Kramer v. Union School Free District.'
Because these laws impinge on the same fundamental rights of voting and association as
do ballot access statutes, it was consistent for the Court to extend vigorous review to ballot
access legislation as well. Second, Anderson held that a major purpose of its invalidation of
Ohio's ballot access law was to assure the free flow of political ideas in the state by
protecting the rights of supporters of third party and independent candidates to or-
252 Id. at 973 (Stevens, J., concurring).
"3 Anderson, 460 U.S. al 787.
'5' Id.
255 "in this case, we base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments and
do not engage in separate Equal Protection Clause analysis." Id. at 786-87, n.7.
256 Id. The Anderson majority did not specifically state whether equal protection suits could
continue to be brought to challenge ballot access laws. Apparently, however, the Court did intend to
permit such suits. Footnote 7 stated: "we rely ... on the analysis of a number of our prior election
cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
257 Id.
"" Id. at 786-87.
259 See, e.g., Williams , 393 U.S. at 29 (the Constitutional violation by Ohio was burdening the first
amendment rights of supporters of third party and independent candidates more than those of
supporters of Democratic and Republican candidates).
260 See supra notes 254-58 and accompanying text.
26 ' 414 U.S. 51, 57-60 (1973).
262 405 U.S. 330, 349-60 (1972).
380 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1965).
264 395 U.S. 621, 626-28 (1969).
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ganize.2" The Court has taken the same approach in previous ballot access rulings.'" It
noted in its earlier decision in Williams v. Rhodes that competition in ideas was a major
element in election campaigns. 267 Indeed, the Court has observed that an election is as
much a means of disseminating ideas as it is a way of achieving office.'" The Court has
also held that overbroad ballot access restrictions deprive voters not supporting major
party candidates of their incentive to organize and to express their political views.'"
Anderson maintained that excessively restricting conditions for ballot access can have a
chilling effect on small political groups and can injure the vitality of American political
life,'" Thus, Anderson was decided in accordance with the basic policy considerations the
Court expressed in its earlier decisions including Williams and its progeny.
The position taken by the dissent in Anderson is inconsistent with the trend toward
using a strict standard. Justice Rehnquist's arguinent that the standard used in ballot
access legislation generally has been minimum scrutiny27' is not supported by precedent.
At the very least, the Court in each decision has claimed it was applying some higher level
of scrutiny:27' Most often, as in American Party of Texas v. White 272 and Storer v. Brown , 274 the
Court used a mixed standard of review by inquiring into whether the state legislation
protected a compelling interest, but not into whether the state used the least restrictive
alternative. 275 Moreover, the dissent identified the central issue in Anderson as the right to
candidacy, a right the Court has never recognized as fundamental."' Justice Rehnquist's
focus on the state's power to regulate candidates rather than on the limitations on the
state's ability to restrict voters' rights has been used in only one other ruling — the
plurality opinion in Clements v. Fashing277 which Justice Rehnquist wrote. This approach
contradicts the stated purpose of most of the Court's ballot access decisions — maximiza-
tion of the voter's right to find a candidate of his own political persuasion on the ballot."'
Despite the inaccuracy of the Anderson dissent's assertion that precedent indicates that
the rational relationship test is ordinarily the appropriate level of review of ballot access
laws, the dissent is correct in its argument that the majority's view that states have a
minimal interest in a national election is a novel proposition. 279 The majority cited only
one case to support its assertion — Cousins v. Wigoda . 2" Cousins, the majority claimed,
stood for the proposition that the national interest in the selection of candidates for
national office far outweighs the interest of any individual state. 20 ' The Cousins Court,
however, did not make that precise ruling. Rather, in Cousins, the Court held that a state
2" Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793-94, 798.
216 See, e.g., Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 186; Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
2"7 Williams, 393 U.S. at 32.
2" Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 186.
2" Williams, 393 U.S. at 41 (Harlan, J., concurring).
270 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 n.8.
271 Id. at 817 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
272 See supra notes 44.133 and accompanying text.
2" 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974).
2" 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974).
275 See also 1, TRIBE, supra note 95, at 782-83.
2" See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 807 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. at 963
(Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
2" 457 U.S. 957, 963 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion).
270 See supra notes 267-69 and accompanying text.
279 460 U.S. 780, 815 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"° 419 U.S. 477 (1974).
"' Anderson, 460 U.S. at 795.
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does not have a sufficient interest in the outcome of a national party convention to
demand that the convention seat delegates according to the state's, rather than the party's,
election rules. 2" The Court noted in Cousins that if every state could establish qualifica-
tions for national delegates without regard to party policy, states could destroy the
effectiveness of a national party convention as a concerted enterprise in the vital process
of choosing presidential and vice-presidential candidates.' It observed further that the
states themselves had no constitutionally mandated role in the task of selecting those
candidates." The Court did not, however, extend its ruling to hold that in elections, and
not merely in conventions, two levels of state interest were present: the state's interest in
intrastate elections and the state's interest in national elections. Nor did the Cousins Court
hold that a state's power to condition candidates' access to the ballot is measured in part by
the interest the state has in the election in question. Nevertheless, the Anderson Court
claimed that its holding — that in setting restrictions on access to the presidential ballot,
states enter an area in which the national interest is far greater than the interest of any
individual state — was grounded on Cousins?' The Anderson ruling has no direct support
either from Cousins, which ruled merely that each state cannot establish its own rules for
election of delegates to a national party's convention, or from the Court's decisions on the
issue of ballot access. 2"
B. The Questions Remaining
The Anderson Court established two types of strict scrutiny for ballot access legisla-
tion. The Court held that the state must demonstrate that its statute is the least restrictive
means available to serve a compelling state interest to justify a state imposed limitation on
access to the ballot in any election. 282 In addition, the Court specified that when the
election is for president or vice president, the state has the additional burden of showing
that the interest that the legislation serves is not merely vital to the state, but is so urgent
that it justifies weakening a national campaign effort and therefore limiting the right of
voters in other states to cast their votes effectively.'
Anderson's creation of two levels of strict scrutiny, one for state laws limiting access to
the ballot for intrastate offices and a higher level for legislation limiting access to the ballot
for national offices," presents new problems in ballot access analysis. The Anderson
decision emphasizes that a state must have a vital interest to advance by its restriction on
access to the ballot in a presidential election. 2" According to the Court, however, a state's
interest in voter education which might be compelling in an intrastate or local contest, was
282
 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1974).
283 Id. at 490.
2" Id. at 489-90.
288 See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying text.
2" See, e.g., Illinois Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979) (local
election); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (gubernatorial election); Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (congressional election); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)
(presidential election). The scope of the elections was not mentioned by the Court in any of these
cases as a factor in its analyses of whether the statutes the candidates challenged could pass equal
protection scrutiny.
2" Anderson, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
2"
 Id. at 795.
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not a compelling interest in a presidential election."' In addition, the Anderson Court
ruled that the state interest in preventing unbridled intraparty feuding, which the Court
found a vital state concern in congressional elections in Storer, was not an urgent state
interest in presidential elections."' The Court gave no hint of what state needs it would
find sufficiently vital to justify conditions to ballot access in a national campaign.
In Anderson, the Court affirmed earlier rulings holding that the means a state chooses
to serve its interests must not be unnecessarily restrictive of voters first amendment
rights.'" The Court also held, however, that in a presidential election, the restrictiveness
of the state's ballot access limitation should be judged by its impact on voters at a national
level, not merely by its impact on voters at a statewide or local level.'" This latter
holding seems to require that burdens on presidential candidates be even less restrictive
than burdens on other candidates. The Court, however, did not refine this concept or
give any example of what a sufficiently narrowly tailored ballot access device might be in
the context of a presidential election.
Although the Court has never laid down guidelines for the states on what ballot
access legislation is permissible, its earlier decisions did provide some direction. For
example, the Court found that avoiding clogging of the election machinery"' and pre-
venting voter confusion"' through limiting the number of candidates on ballots were vital
state concerns. In addition, it ruled that preventing the division of the vote among so
many candidates that none could win a majority was a compelling state interest in light of
the public costs involved in run-off elections. 297 Further, the Court determined that the
avoidance of intraparty strife was a vital state concern because cohesive, well-functioning
parties were important components of a stable democracy."' Some devices which the
Court approved include modest minimum support requirements"' and reasonable dis-
affiliation statutes. 3" The Court determined that these means can forward important
state concerns and only minimally restrict voters' rights. 3" Anderson did not indicate,
however, whether any of the interests or devices the Court upheld in its prior decisions
could survive the new heightened strict scrutiny applicable to ballot access limitations on
presidential candidates. Its earlier rulings on the concerns and the means that pass strict
scrutiny therefore can have current validity only for state and local elections. The Court
might not uphold any of them as appropriate to a presidential election.
Further, it would seem that Anderson's creation of two levels of strict scrutiny of ballot
access legislation would involve the Courtin extremely difficult analytic problems. Inter-
ests held to be compelling and regulations found to be precisely drawn in the context of
state and local elections need not be so in the context of a presidential election. A
minimum number of signatures, for example, which a state can require for a ballot
position for a gubernatorial candidate might arguably be too high for a presidential
candidate. The state's interest in the outcome of a presidential election would be less,
"' 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983).
292 Id. at 804.
293 Id. at 789.
294 Id. at 794-95.
299 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 145.
296 Id.
29? Id.
299 Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 735 (1974).
299 Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. at 185-86.
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. at 736.
391 See supra notes 299-300.
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under Anderson, than its interest in the outcome of a state election and the barrier to ballot
access that the state establishes would be a hindrance to a nationwide and not merely a
statewide election effort. Presumably, therefore, the signature requirement for ballot
access should be lower under Anderson in a presidential election than in a state election. To
say the least, it would be difficult to discover exactly what that lower requirement should
be. The same analytic problems would be involved in ruling on the validity of disaffiliation
statutes and every other device a state might use to limit ballot access in a presidential
election. Therefore, although Anderson clarifies that legislation limiting access to the ballot
in intrastate elections is subject to strict scrutiny, Anderson's requirement of a heightened
strict scrutiny of ballot access restrictions for presidential and vice-presidential candidates
creates new confusion. States appear to have less guidance than before Anderson on what
state interests the Court would find sufficiently vital to justify ballot access limitations on
candidates for national office and what means the Court would find sufficiently narrowly
tailored to advance those interests.
CONCLUSION
The Anderson decision attempted to clarify the baffling series of Supreme Court
opinions on the validity of state ballot access legislation.'" The Court's rulings from
William v. Rhodes to Clements v. Fashing employed three different levels of review of state
ballot access statutes.303
 Although Justice Stevens, writing for the Anderson majority, never
identified his standard of review by the traditional terms associated with strict scrutiny, he
subjected Ohio's law to a rigorous review.'" The decision therefore reinforces the in-
terpretation that ballot access laws which impose significant burdens on voters' first
amendment rights must receive vigorous scrutiny by the courts. Also significant is that the
decision made clear equal protection analysis is not necessary in ballot access cases."' The
Anderson Court held that the constitutionality of ballot access laws can be measured solely
by the extent to which they unnecessarily restrict voters' first amendment rights.'" In
addition, however, the Anderson Court has drawn a distinction between the states' power
to regulate access to the ballot in intrastate elections in contrast to national elections.'"
This distinction complicates ballot access analysis by suggesting that legislation which may
pass strict scrutiny as applied to state elections might not be valid for presidential
elections. 308 In sum, after Anderson, states have somewhat more guidance than they had
before on what ballot position qualifications they can enact for intrastate elections. As
regards national elections, however, they may have less guidance because the Court did
not give any indication of what state interests would be sufficiently compelling to condi-
tion ballot access for presidential candidates or what devices the Court would find
sufficiently narrowly tailored in furthering such an interest.
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